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Introduction
Today, we are told, the practice of resistance – especially political resistance in the
form of protest and activism – is making a comeback. ‘The world is facing a wave
of uprisings, protests and revolutions’, according to the back cover of Paul
Mason’s influential recent book Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere (2012), an
engrossing text that has become something of a handbook for all sorts of activ‐
ists, from hard-core cyber-protestors to would-be revolutionaries. But while
resistance is once again highly fashionable, we should not lose sight of the fact
that it is also characterized by a palpable lack of definitional consensus, with the
term being employed in a haphazard fashion to describe everything from full-
blown revolutionary protest (Adib-Moghaddam, 2013; McDermott & Stibbe,
2006) to women who watch television soap operas (Brown, 1994). This broad
application of the label ‘resistance’ to a very diverse and often contradictory set of
practices also extends to a growing number of activities and pursuits that occur
within the discipline of criminology. It is essential therefore that criminologists
interested in studying the subject do so with some measure of conceptual clarity.
This article aims to provide a more analytical understanding of the label ‘resist‐
ance’ – especially as it is deployed and appropriated in Western liberal democra‐
cies. It sets out from the premise that the notion of resistance, although it has
been current in criminology for some time, is still vaguely defined. In order to
provide more analytical precision, we will first review how notions of resistance
and rebellion are currently employed within criminology generally and cultural
criminology specifically. In the second part, we explore the implications for how
we might conceive of a conception of resistance as a positive or ‘creative force’,
rather than simply a negative counter-reaction against cultural, social or econom‐
ical power relations that exist at a particular moment in a society. The third part
is devoted to four events that radically transform a certain situation in the fields
of politics, art, love and science. In the fourth part we investigate the limitations
of resistance by reference to the counterculture of the Sixties. In the fifth and
final part, we put forward the case for thinking about resistance as a three-stage
process.
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Resistance everywhere?
Despite a recent revival of interest in the subject, resistance remains a highly
underdeveloped concept within the social sciences.1 Even when the term domi‐
nates very specific disciplinary subfields such as new social movement theory,
post-material politics, or the sociology of insurrection there is little agreement on
the parameters of the term. It is a similar case with cultural criminology. While
cultural criminologists readily deploy the term there has been almost no theoreti‐
cal debate on the concept of resistance itself (see Brisman, 2010 for a rare excep‐
tion). Rather than being theorized, different examples of subversive behaviour,
youthful subcultural practices, and social movements are all-too-often simply
lauded as forms or repertoires of resistance.2 As a consequence, it is difficult to
address why one type of behaviour is called resistance and another not. Writing
urban graffiti, for example, is seen as resistance against ‘the confinement of kids
and others within structures of social and spatial control’ (Ferrell, 1995). Like‐
wise, digital culture jammers such as Anne-Marie Schleiner, whose work includes
writing subversive images and captions on the virtual surfaces of militaristic
video games like Counterstrike, are discussed (admittedly with some reservation)
within the context of ‘resistance to imperialism’ (Ferrell et al., 2008: 149; De Jong
& Schuilenburg, 2006: 64-71). Even the contemporary street gang is considered
by some cultural criminologists less as a pathological or criminal entity and more
a political organisation, predicated on ‘resistance to state oppression’ (Brother‐
ton, 2004). These and other examples illustrate that, for better or worse, one of
the defining features of cultural criminology has been the celebration of an eclec‐
tic array of resistance forms – or as the late great Jock Young writes in The Vertigo
of Late Modernity, ‘resistance is always there’ (2007: 77). But is there a need for
greater precision when it comes to aligning cultural criminology with contempo‐
rary practices that purport to be functioning as resistance to wider social, eco‐
nomic or political forces? We think there is. Consider, then, two further forms or
repertoires of resistance from recent critical criminology.
Sticking with Jock Young, in his recent work The Criminological Imagination
(2011) Young continues to uphold his assertion that ‘resistance is always there’.
Drawing on Michel Maffesoli’s (1996) notion of ‘postmodern neo-tribalism’,
Young sees ‘the youth cultural forms’ associated with the Ibiza club and drug
scene as a ‘form of resistance’. However, as one of us can attest from having
undertaken empirical research in and around Ibiza’s mega clubs in 2011, in reality
“resistance” is in rather short supply in these environments. Indeed, the intoxicat‐
1 We wish to state at the outset that this paper is concerned with social scientific accounts of
resistance in the context of Western liberal democracies. We recognize that elsewhere in the
world (perhaps most notably Latin America) political and cultural resistance takes different
forms and has a very different history.
2 We should point out that this is not the first time that the subject of resistance has been debated
within criminology. Most notably in the late 1960s and 1970s there was much discussion among
Marxist and leftist criminologists about whether or not forms of street crime such as mugging
and even burglary could be conceived as a form of crypto-political resistance against capitalist
oppression (see, most famously, Hall et al., 1978).
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ed punters on the streets of San Antonio are anything but purveyors of Maffeso‐
lian puissance. Instead they are simply reflections of the dominant capitalist
order, an order which seeks only to transform itself into more of the same (Hay‐
ward & Hobbs, 2007). A second example is actually a more general point about a
certain type of paper that we have encountered over the years at various crimino‐
logical conferences. These papers typically take the following familiar form. To
start with, they engage with supposedly controversial subject matter (often linked
to the researcher’s particular personal or biographical interests). Examples here
might include say sadomasochism, a new form of street art, or an allegedly con‐
troversial ‘outsider’ or ‘rebel’ figure from popular culture. The researcher then
slathers the chosen subject matter with the sheen of ‘resistance’ and we are told
that this is enough to warrant the attention of cultural criminologists. While
these papers may have some sort of descriptive value, we wish to stress that in
such cases the term ‘resistance’ is being deployed more for effect than as a rigor‐
ous analytical category. For example, with tawdry BDSM (Bondage/domination/
sadomasochism) novels such as Fifty Shades of Grey topping the best seller lists
and high-street retail chains selling dominatrix gear, it’s hard to understand
exactly how accounts of erotic sexual practice are in any way synonymous with
resistance – unless, of course, one is referring to the chaffing caused by handcuffs
and leg restraints… In summary, then, despite the fact that the label ‘resistance’
is widely used and fostered in (cultural) criminology, we remain in a strange posi‐
tion. In far too many cases, we still don’t know exactly what resistance means.
In a bid to add some conceptual precision let us take a moment to discuss an
important paper on resistance that has been largely ignored by criminologists:
Jocelyn Hollander and Rachel Einwohner’s influential article ‘Conceptualizing
resistance’ (2004). Hollander and Einwohner’s starting premise is the same as
ours, specifically that while ‘resistance is a fashionable subject’ there is absolutely
no consensus on its definition (2004: 533). In a bid to address this shortcoming,
the authors present a ‘typology of resistance forms’ that aims to move beyond
definitional debates to focus instead on the distinct analytical components of
resistance. After a detailed review of the pre-existing social scientific literature,
Hollander and Einwohner identify eight types of resistance (‘overt resistance’;
‘covert resistance’; ‘unwitting resistance’; ‘target-defined resistance’; ‘externally-
defined resistance’; ‘missed resistance’; ‘attempted resistance’; and ‘not resist‐
ance’). They then pose each mode of resistance three straightforward ‘yes’ and
‘no’ questions: ‘Is act [of resistance] intended as resistance by actor?’; ‘Is act [of
resistance] recognized as resistance by target?’; and ‘Is act [of resistance] recog‐
nized as resistance by observer?’. Fairly obviously, mass street-level political pro‐
test is classified as ‘overt resistance’, because the answer to all three questions is
an unequivocal ‘yes’. However, other forms of resistance are more opaque. So, for
example, ‘unwitting resistance’ such as the ‘Tomboy’ behavior of girls or day‐
dreaming at work may not be intended as resistance by the actor (i.e. ‘no’ to ques‐
tion one), but is often recognized as threatening by targets and other observers
(i.e. ‘yes’ to questions two and three). In summary, the key analytical components
for Hollander and Einwohner are ‘intention’ and ‘recognition’. We agree, but for
our purposes it is the penultimate type of resistance – ‘attempted resist‐
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ance’ – that is of most interest, as we believe that much of what passes for ‘resist‐
ance’ in criminology, and indeed the social sciences more generally, today can
actually be classified under this category. Consider, as evidence, our two examples
from earlier: the drink-and-drug related hedonism associated with the Ibiza club
scene, and the supposedly transgressive practices associated with BDSM. In both
cases, it doesn’t matter one iota if the actor thinks that what he or she is doing is
resistance if the act itself either goes unnoticed or does not threaten the observer
or the surrounding environment. In Ibiza, for example, virtually the whole island
is predicated on hedonism, something reflected in the laissez-faire stance of the
San Antonio police department to overt drug use on popular sunset beach spots.
To put it another way, much of today’s so-called rebellion is nothing of the sort.
Instead of challenging the status quo, too much contemporary resistance ends up
simply reaffirming the pre-existing socio-political situation (Heath & Potter,
2006). It is to this very point that we now turn.
Resisting ‘dogmatic images of thought’
One of the central features of cultural criminology as so far imagined has been
the attention it has paid to crime and crime control, to emotion and rationality,
and to resistance and submission – especially in the context of everyday life (Ferrell
et al., 2008 Ch. 4; Hayward, 2004). It is this framing of everyday life, which also
runs through various studies of resistance, emphasizing that meaningful state‐
ments and knowledge are produced and regulated through the rules of social
practices. For example, in his analysis of the configuration of power and authority
in criminology, Ferrell states that ‘systems of domination’ reside ‘in structures of
knowledge, perception, and understanding’. As a consequence, ‘authority oper‐
ates not only through prison cells and poverty, but by constructing and defending
epistemologies of universality and truth’ (Ferrell, 1994: 162). The idea that a
social practice mediates the way that a topic can be meaningfully discussed and
reasoned about resembles Foucault’s notion of a discourse. To gain a better
understanding of the relation between a discourse and the act of resistance, we
must first consider both what a discourse is and its function as a semi-autono‐
mous practice. Only then will we be in a position to consider how resistance
works in this context, to what ends, and at what cost.
In his analysis of our modern society, Michel Foucault defined a discourse as ‘a
group of statements that belong to the same discursive formation’ (1972: 117).
As he argued, any discourse that has been built and rebuilt over a long period of
time is ‘controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of
procedures’ (1981: 52). As such, any discourse is accompanied by rules of power
regarding prohibition, exclusion, inclusion and the repression of everything that
is, or could have been, seen and spoken. As a consequence, each discourse not
only excludes other discourses, but also produces outsiders by using binary
dichotomies such as ‘normal-abnormal’, ‘reason-madness’ and ‘sick-healthy’.
Truth, or, more accurately, the ‘true-false’ dichotomy, is one of those systems of
rules inherent to a discourse. By way of an example, consider Foucault’s discus‐
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sion of Gregor Mendel [1822-1884] – the acknowledged father of modern genet‐
ics – in his now-famous inaugural lecture ‘The Order of Discourse’ at the Collège
de France. In this address, Foucault stated that, although Mendel spoke the ‘truth’
with respect to the process of genetic inheritance, his path breaking scientific dis‐
covery did not fit ‘within the “true” of the biological discourse’ (1981: 61) of the
19th century.
It is precisely by the way procedures of inclusion and exclusion work, that it
becomes apparent that each established discourse (scientific or otherwise) is
structured by a dogmatic (or orthodox) image of thought that is pre-supposed in all
disciplines and that must be seen as ‘a template for conceiving the world’ (May,
2005: 74). Set against the function of a discourse, as Foucault described it, it
becomes apparent that such an image of thought involves a particular set of ‘sub‐
jective and objective presuppositions’ (Deleuze, 1994). This set of presupposi‐
tions precedes or underlies a certain discourse and in a sense guides the thinking in
that discourse. Take, for instance, philosophy in which a set of presuppositions
can be found in the work of René Descartes. According to Descartes, the inceptor
of modern philosophy, thought has always an orientation towards the category of
‘truth’. Likewise, in economics, another long-established discourse, a deeply
entrenched set of philosophical presuppositions can be found in the definition of
man as a rational animal who arrives at his optimum strategies through pure cal‐
culation (see Hayward 2007; 2011 for cultural criminology’s position on rational‐
ity).
In short, this means that each discourse always starts with a particular set of pre‐
suppositions. These presuppositions take the following form: ‘everybody knows
this… everybody recognizes this… nobody can deny it’ (Deleuze, 1994: 129-131).
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these presuppositions are essen‐
tially conscious or need to be spoken. Indeed as Gilles Deleuze makes clear, ‘they
function all the more effectively in silence’ (1994: 167). Nevertheless, one way to
describe them is through the notions of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’. Good
sense is what everyone with good intuitions has; common sense, which is sense of
the ‘in-common’, is to be able to recognise what is obvious. Common sense and
good sense together is what everybody knows or should know. In ancient Greek,
the co-formation of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ is called doxa (δόξα from
δοκεῖν dokein). Doxa is a conformist conception of thought that is expressed in
popular opinions and common belief, which are based on the most banal act of
everyday thinking: the principle of communication. In Republic, Plato placed doxa
between ‘knowledge’ (gnôsis/epistêmê) and ‘ignorance’ (agnôsia), ‘an intermediate
state which is not knowledge but at least provides some starting-points in the
quest for real understanding’ (Szaif, 2007). Similarly, the French sociologist
Pierre Bourdieu used the term ‘doxa’ in his book Outline of a Theory of Practice as a
description for what is taken for granted in a society. According to Bourdieu, doxa
exists in the universe of the undisputed, in ‘the twofold sense of what goes with‐
out saying and what cannot be said’ (1977: 170).
Taken together, then, Foucault and Deleuze suggest that each discourse is accom‐
panied with, on the one hand, procedures of inclusion and exclusion, and on the
other hand, a dogmatic image of thought that simply relays and reaffirms purport‐
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ed actual knowledge and the demands of popular opinion. This means that to
overcome common opinions, one must inevitably confront the fundamental ques‐
tion of how to move from a dogmatic image of thought to a new image of thought, one
that no longer dogmatically reproduces the assumptions of common sense or the
clichés of cultural representation. In other words, to confront a specific discourse
means to confront it with the problem of its presuppositions. It is at this point that
two important and interconnected problems emerge, issues that are essential for
making sense of how resistance is employed within cultural criminology. The first
problem concerns the role of creativity within resistance. If resistance is about
replacing one dogmatic image of thought with something new (in Žižekian terms,
for example, trying to develop new political forms that are capable of looking
beyond ‘the capitalist horizon’, Žižek, 2009), then to what extent does such a
transformation demand that resistance includes a necessarily positive or creative
dimension, in the sense of being able to think or culturally represent something
that transcends existing dogmatic images of thought? The second problem stems
directly from the first: specifically, is there a danger that, by stressing creativity
over and above other elements – say, for example, robust street-level protest and
intervention – certain resistance activities might be reduced to simple acts of com‐
munication, empty cultural messages devoid of any real transformative potential?
In a bid to answer these questions, it is instructive to consider the origins of the
term ‘resistance’.
What is creative resistance?
The historical origins of the term resistance can be found in the Old French resis‐
tance and Late Latin resistentia, both of which have a reference to ‘make a stand
against, oppose, to stand back, or withstand’. As such, the etymological root of
the term is unambiguous: the ‘re’ in resistance means ‘against’, and as such resist‐
ance is framed clearly as a negative term, meaning those personal acts exerted
against the exercise of power by institutions, persons or a dominant social struc‐
ture. Expressed in more philosophical terms, ‘resistance’ refers to any force,
which acts contrary to another. We wish to argue that today a subtle but impor‐
tant transformation is taking place regarding the usage of the term. Let us
explain.
To start with, we reject the common idea that ‘resistance is always there’. To put
it bluntly, we think that people resist in the true sense of the term (i.e. by taking a
highly principled stance in a bid to resist or withstand something oppressive and
specific) only very rarely. Instead, whether it’s the liberal ‘faux-hemiansm’ of the
urban hipster, or the primitivist proclamations of the radically detached green life
stylist, what is more common in the West today is the reactive gesture; something
akin to what Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 2007) identified in On the Genealogy of
Morality, as ‘a reaction to the behaviour of the masters’. This type of reaction
maybe subversive and pessimistic about existing circumstances but it is not oppo‐
sitional behaviour in the sense that it does not represent a meaningful challenge
to the doxa. Indeed, labelling every dissenting voice ‘resistance’ is inaccurate and
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counterproductive. Instead, as Hollander and Einwohner made clear earlier, in
reality many such actions are better understood as ‘attempted resistance’. This is
not to say that today’s many ‘reactive gestures’ are not creative – quite the con‐
trary. In many cases these expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction with existing
circumstances and presuppositions (doxa) are extremely creative and, as we will
see below, are vital when it comes to developing the means to resist established
forms of dogmatic thought, to challenge common norms and plough up common
ground.
However, before we discuss the role of creativity further by asking whether the
historic framing of the word resistance as a negative verb has ensured that the
more creative elements of the term have been overlooked. We must first say
something about how, if it is indeed true that ‘to resist = to create’, the creative
aspects of resistance differ from simple communication. Generally, communica‐
tion is understood as ‘a logic that extends what we have already grasped and rec‐
ognized in representational form about the past and attempts to extend this
information to the future’ (Lorraine, 2011: 17). In other words, communication is
transmitting information from sender to receiver, with the ultimate goal of
reaching agreement or establishing consensus between the interactans. Social
communication, then, is resulting in an ever-expanding ‘common ground’ (Clark,
1996). In the name of communication, several forms of resistance have been
completely defused. A good example is the recent Occupy Movement, a protest
movement driven by people’s discontent with social and economic inequality,
which has spiraled into irrelevance because it was unable to establish a political
dissensus, irreducible to the ‘objectivity’ of a given neo-liberal logic.
Having outlined how important it is for resistance to go beyond communication,
let us now explore further the creative dimension of resistance, and whether or
not, in part at least, to create means to resist? In particular, let us pose the more
substantive question: if we accept that resistance is a positive and creative proc‐
ess, then how might such creativity help challenge established forms of dogmatic
thought, in particular the common sense or doxa? In what follows we attempt to
answer this very question by distinguishing four different ways to penetrate a dis‐
course and therefore resist doxa – four ways to move from a dogmatic image of
thought to a new image of thought that no longer unbendingly reproduces the
assumptions of common sense or the clichés of cultural or political representa‐
tion.
Four types of creative acts
Thinking of resistance in creative terms is difficult, but it also offers a better way
of understanding the term as it is often problematically articulated in cultural
criminology. To understand exactly what we mean by this let us return to the
aforementioned discussion of discourse and how, over a long period of time, it is
built and rebuilt, controlled, selected, organised and guarded to the extent that
ultimately it becomes structured by a dogmatic (or orthodox) image of thought. In
that discussion we also stated that each discourse sees itself as always confronted
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with the question of how to deal with its own presuppositions. One way to count‐
er such a set of presuppositions is to understand that there are different fields in
which a dogmatic image of thought operates – and thus in which resistance can
take place. The French philosopher Alain Badiou distinguishes four semi-
autonomous practices or, in his words, ‘truth procedures’ that illustrate the idea
of resistance as a creative act: politics, love, science, and art. In each of these
fields events can take place that change each field fundamentally and which can‐
not be reduced to the domain of doxa. Although events that break with the rou‐
tines and opinions of these fields are relatively rare, they can be understood as ‘a
logical rupture with dominant and circulating opinions’ (Badiou, 2005: 5-6).
Before clarifying this idea further, we need to distinguish four types of events,
each accustomed to one of the aforementioned practices of politics, love, science,
and art: ‘a political revolution, an amorous encounter, an invention of the sci‐
ences or a creation of art’ (Badiou, 2000: 90-91). As concerned to arts, a good
example, and one much commented on, would be the creative function of poetry
and how it opposes normal forms of communication. For instance in the work of
Stéphane Mallarmé and Paul Celan, poetry interrupts language and liberates it
‘from the existing regime of representation (habits, conventions, clichés, and so
on)’ (Hallward, 2003: 197). Likewise in painting and literature, we find examples
of artists who invent a new language by resisting what is taken for granted in
these disciplines. In painting, for instance, the genius of Francis Bacon lies in the
fact that he resisted a long tradition of organic representation or complete
abstraction in art and created an existential language occupying a grey area
between representation and abstraction. Similar processes can be pointed to in
literature. William Burroughs, for example, with his radical cut-up technique,
pushed language beyond the limits of representation and opened his texts to a
radical reconfiguration of human subjectivity.
Regarding the discourse of science, established knowledge is organized in a para‐
digm that structures and guides direction to research and scientific efforts (Kuhn,
[1962] 2012). In this discourse, a scientific revolution occurs when a dominant
set of expectations and assumptions is overturned and replaced by another. Sci‐
entists move from one paradigm to another by the invention of new ideas and the
debunking of the common sense that nothing is more certain than the ‘hard facts’
of a dominant paradigm. Classic examples of paradigm shifts are the Copernican
revolution, Einstein’s theories and the physics of Galileo. In a way similar to sci‐
ence and art, this process can be encountered in the practice of love. First and
foremost, love must not be seen as a romantic conception, a variant of desire or a
matter of pleasure, but as a transformative power that forever changes two individ‐
uals. An amorous encounter takes place then ‘in the joy of the empty gap of the
Two of the sexes which it founds’ (Badiou, 2008: 161).
In the case of politics, the last of the four disciplines, a radical transformation
takes place in the form of a revolution. A revolution sweeps away a whole social
and political system and helps replace it with another. According to Badiou,
examples of a revolutionary break are the Jacobin Revolution in 1794, the Revo‐
lution of 1848, and the October Revolution of 1917. In each of these events a
novel mode of being-in-the-world is created that breaks with ordinary, estab‐
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lished life as such.3 The French Revolution, for example, ruptured the power rela‐
tions between the aristocracy and the people and showed what the main feature
of the Ancien Régime was: the legal inequality between the different positions in
society. As we can now see, resistance is never solely the result of communication
or consensus. It is an event that brings about the ‘new’ in a situation. It disrupts
relations of power and resists the norms of a certain situation (‘what is’) – and
breaks as such fundamentally with the prevailing practice.
Each of these avenues for transcending dogmatic images of thought will be of
some interest to cultural criminologists. But in terms of the original objective of
this article (to provide criminologists with a measure of conceptual clarity when
dealing with the subject of resistance), it is the fourth practice that is most impor‐
tant: the radical transformation associated with revolution. After all, for certain
cultural criminologists, radical political and social change is at the heart of the
endeavour (Ferrell, 1998, 2009). At this point we return to our earlier assertion
that, today, a subtle but important transformation is taking place regarding the
usage of the label resistance. To illustrate what we mean by this, it is instructive
to focus on the clear distinction that exists between the types of revolutions out‐
lined above, where a fundamental radical rupture takes place in society as a
whole, and ‘revolutions’ of a more recent vintage, such as the (counter) culture
revolution of the 1960s that culminated in the events of ‘May ’68’, and more
recently the Arab Spring of 2011. This distinction is important for two reasons.
First, it highlights how in late modernity it can be difficult in political terms to
overcome the existing doxa. For example, if we look at the situation today in
Egypt following the tumultuous events of January 2011 we can see that, although
a revolution of sorts took place; it was not one that transcended the pre-existing
dogmatic image of thought. President Hosni Mubarak’s longstanding regime was
certainly toppled, but it was eventually replaced with something very similar,
another crypto-democracy in which the real power continues to reside with the
military class. Likewise, no sooner had Mubarak been unseated, than the tradi‐
tional clerics and Islamic politicos of the Muslim Brotherhood took to the streets
in a bid to gain support and impose their own dogmatic ideas. Second, it high‐
lights how, in contemporary society generally and cultural criminology specifi‐
cally, resistance now functions as a three-stage process. To understand these
points let us take a closer look at the transformations that occurred as a result of
the 1960s counter culture and how they shaped current thinking on resistance.
3 A fundamental question is whether or not a revolution always entails violence? Clearly, Badiou
does not dismiss violence out of hand. Indeed, according to Badiou, it is impossible to say ‘Never
violence’. However, he has recently introduced the idea of ‘defensive violence’ in relation to the
revolts in Egypt and Tunisia by building free spaces at a distance from the power of the state.
Violence by the protesters only then takes place when the state itself uses violence to crush these
spaces.
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The possibilities and limitations of resistance – ‘Sixties’ style
Like it or not, the counter culture changed the way the West understood the con‐
cept of resistance forever. For the student radicals and counter culture leftists,
the Sixties was a golden age of change and protest, the underlying goal being the
creation of a fairer, more progressive, and less inhibited society. The transforma‐
tive spirit of the age is captured in some of the book titles that have subsequently
attempted to chronicle the decade (e.g. The World the 1960s Made, Coming Apart,
The Sixties and the End of Modern America). Read these texts and you might be for‐
given for thinking that little if anything remained undisturbed by the various rup‐
tures brought about by the counterculture. But in reality this was not the case.
Many of the political gains of the era were partial, mixed, or late arriving, and in
the very few industrialized countries that were actually affected by the counter‐
culture, it was as much a case of continuity as change. True, at the start of the
decade, when diverse activist groups functioned collectively, some tremendous
gains were made. But while the new radicals of the ’60s youth revolution posed a
far greater threat to capitalism than anything devised in the 1950s, by the end of
the decade, any sense of collective politics had long since evaporated. The reason,
of course, was the state and its attendant capitalist system were still all-powerful.
In the United States, the radicals were viciously beaten down by the Chicago
Police Department at the 1968 Democratic Convention, and two years later the
full force of the state was unleashed at Kent State University, where four
unarmed student protestors were fatally shot by the Ohio National Guard. It was
a period marked by similar shows of police strength against student protestors in
a number of Western cities, including London, Madrid, Rome, and Berlin – where
in 1967 an unarmed student was shot in the head during protests against an offi‐
cial visit of the Shah of Iran. Unsurprisingly, experiencing the power of the state
close up had a sobering effect on many radicals, especially in the United States.
And after the heady days of the ‘May 1968’ Paris rebellion fizzled out only to be
replaced by a retrenched Gaullist party, many on the left faced up to the fact that
the revolutionary party was over.4 At street level, this loss of faith in wide scale
political transformation had two consequences. First, a pronounced flight from
collective politics took place. The unity that was such a feature of the Movement’s
early success was replaced with a new landscape of single-issue concerns and inde‐
pendent political causes, exemplified by the rise of feminist separatists, environ‐
mental and gay rights campaigners, and most notably ‘Black Power’ activists
concerned only with the idea of a separate black state. Second, as it became
increasingly clear to all but the most drug-addled that the leftist student Move‐
ment had failed in its attempt to overthrow the corporate state and its supposed
system of control and manipulation, a new more atomized template of ‘resist‐
4 Our analysis of post-1968 resistance forms is limited predominantly to developments in the
Anglo-American world. We recognize that in continental Europe a more robust, politicized cam‐
paign of resistance to capitalism and statist militarism took place in the 1970s in places such as
the former West Germany, Italy, France, Spain and Greece. By the 1980s though, even significant
groups such as the Red Army Faction and Action Directe had lost traction as tangible revolution‐
ary entities.
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ance’ emerged that focused on the arena of the individual and the ideal of the ‘pro‐
test lifestyle’. In sum, for all the posturing, the dogmatic image of thought in the
shape of the dominant capitalist order remained intact.
By the end of the decade, conventional organized politics was giving way to new
modes of putative protest shaped this time by the personal feelings and private
relations associated with the therapeutic turn and its problematic confederate, the
metaphysic of ‘identity’. It is striking, for example, that Black Power activists
rejected the notion of a collective multiracial revolution shortly after they started
emphasizing the need to discover ‘the black inside the Negro’. As astute commen‐
tators, such as Barbara Epstein (1991), have pointed out, the rebellious nature of
the counterculture also brought with it a strong emphasis on self-expression, and
it was this aspect of Sixties culture that came to the fore in the wake of the
botched attempts at revolution. In all of these cases, politics was no longer ‘about
the subordination of the self to some larger political cause; instead it [had
become]… the path to self-fulfillment. This ultimately was the power of sixties
radicalism’ (Echolls, 1994: 164). The left’s decision to follow the narrow path of
self-fulfillment, rather than the broad boulevard of collective politics, led ulti‐
mately to the world of self-interest and self-identified action groups that we now
associate with the term identity politics – an insular and solipsistic preoccupation
with self-transformation that would go on to dominate cultural politics in the
subsequent decades.
Resistance as a three-stage process
Not only did the counterculture gloss over the complexity associated with most
political problems, but more importantly, it also downplayed the role of collec‐
tive, uniform action in bringing about meaningful political change. This
logic – one of the many problematic legacies of a Sixties culture that ended up pri‐
oritizing the self over the cause – facilitated a confused, almost schizophrenic
relationship between the individual and the issue. In sum, what really took place
in the counterculture was a change in culture and lifestyle rather than a revolu‐
tion in politics. The changes that took place occurred through pleasure rather
than through power (Frank, 1997). Accordingly, resistance became as much about
cultural invention as political revolution. Moreover, as a consequence of the ever-
expanding culture industries, inventive forms of resistance (stage 1), such as
rebellious posturing, anti-authoritarian music and film, and the rise of the anti-
hero, were quickly imitated (stage 2) and developed into the default position of a
post-political late modern consumer society. As this resistance became routine or
commonplace, it developed into something akin to the habits of everyday life.
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Against this cultural and political backdrop, political resistance linked to a tangi‐
ble transformative agenda (stage 3) became increasingly rare – in the West at least.5
This situation remains the case today, even though we are supposedly experienc‐
ing a revival of political resistance. Today we inhabit a world of resistance sym‐
bols – or to put it another way, far too much current resistance never gets beyond
the first two stages. As one of us has described elsewhere, to protest today for
many people means the adoption of ‘a resistance lifestyle’ involving the use of
‘radical iconography’ (Hayward, forthcoming). Worse still, as Heath and Potter
(2006: 11) have argued, we are now experiencing a permanent revolution of con‐
sumer culture linked to (youthful) rebellion. Even when resistance and political
protest goes beyond ‘stage 2’, it often lacks real collective political legitimacy.
Consider, the Occupy Movement again, this time in its London manifestation.
After conducting an analysis of protestors at Occupy London, Nikos Sotirakopou‐
los and Chris Rootes (forthcoming) outlined a fractured and individualised on-
the-ground politics. Of the 106 activists they interviewed, 47 identified with the
Greens, 33 with the Labour Party, 8 with the Liberal Democrats, 4 with the Con‐
servative Party, 4 with the Socialist Workers’ Party, and one Communist. Even
the signs of resistance themselves were recycled: the much-photographed ‘Capi‐
talism IS crisis’ banner originally appearing at a Climate Camp earlier in the dec‐
ade.6 In such examples, it’s not just that politics itself is fractured, but that even
when the enemy is agreed upon – in this case the global financial system – protes‐
tors find it hard to go beyond ‘stage 2’ forms of resistance. Consequently, as Sotir‐
akopoulos and Rootes assert, when key demands in such events are ‘equality’ and
‘democracy’, themes so vague as to be almost meaningless, we are experiencing
‘not politics but morality’; a symbolic form of resistance so devoid of political
principle that it risks becoming an empty signifier (Rocamadur, 2013).
It is essential that cultural criminology recognizes this situation and adjusts its
thinking accordingly. Not only does resistance in its ‘stage 1 and 2 form’ make it
harder to generate clearly delineated political principles, but the ‘hedonism-as-
revolutionary’ sensibility that characterizes some cultural criminologists research
interests actually brings with it an untended contempt for incremental demo‐
cratic political action (let alone the working class themselves). In sum, unless cul‐
tural criminology treats resistance seriously, and by that we mean striving to
move beyond Sixties-style stage 2 resistance, it will remain imprisoned by the
same cave of ideas. Or in the words of Deleuze and Guattari: ‘We do not lack com‐
munication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack
resistance to the present’ (1994: 108).
5 These stages resemble in a way the analysis of Gabriel Tarde, one of the forgotten fathers of cul‐
tural criminology, of interpersonal interactions. To find an answer to the question how interac‐
tions take place in general and, more specifically, how interactions provide society with some
degree of social structure, Tarde made a systematic distinction between processes of ‘imitation’
and ‘invention’; two series of interactions that each form a reality in itself, but that also influence
each other (Schuilenburg, 2012).
6 In a related paper on the Athens protests in Syntagma Square, Sotirakopoulos & Sotiropoulos
(2013: 451) similarly found that there was no specific political platform to unify the heterogene‐
ous protestors, only a ‘negative consensus’.
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Conclusion
Our concern in this paper has been to encourage more attention to the notion of
resistance. This was guided by the following question: ‘How to understand resist‐
ance?’ We have argued that resistance is not just a negative term, but can also be
seen as a positive and creative force in society. As such, resistance compels us to
decide a new way of being-in-the-world. One could also say that the primary func‐
tion of resistance is to serve as a solvent of doxa, to continuously question obvi‐
ousness and common sense, in order to create a new image of thought, and thus
to remind us that things do not have to stay the way they are. Unlike other crimi‐
nologists, we maintain that radical transformations in fields such as art and poli‐
tics take place only very rarely. What makes the situation even more complex is
that resistance is not a ‘one-way process’, but that at a deeper level three stages in
the process of resistance can be distinguished: invention, imitation and transfor‐
mation. Each of these stages will attract interest, but it is the third stage that war‐
rants deeper investigation within cultural criminology. This brings us back to the
question raised by this article: what must be assessed is – in the words of Badiou
(2005: 8) – that ‘not to resist is not to think. And not to think is not to risk risk‐
ing.’
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